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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State appeals in this case, claiming that the district court improperly 
dismissed two of the four counts against Mr. Hughes, specifically, the charges of illegal 
possession and wasting of a trophy mule deer. The district court dismissed the two 
felony counts because it concluded that they did not allege felonies as a matter of law. 
It also determined that the State's proposed interpretation of the relevant statutes is 
hopelessly circular and fails to give effect to the plain language of the statutes. 
Mr. Hughes contends that the district court's conclusions were correct, and therefore, 
this Court should reject the State's interpretation of the statutes and affirm the district 
court's order dismissing Counts I and II. He also notes that the interpretation of the 
relevant statutes appears to be an issue of first impression in Idaho. 
Mr. Hughes also renews his assertion that there is no appellate jurisdiction in this 
case under the appellate rules. He maintains that there is no appellate jurisdiction in 
this matter under the Idaho Appellate Rules because the State has impermissibly 
appealed an interlocutory order dismissing two counts of a four-count charging 
document. Therefore, this Court should dismiss the State's appeal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Hughes is alleged to have shot and killed a single mule deer on private land. 1 
(See R., pp.184-85.) He allegedly then field-dressed the deer, and left, planning to 
1 The factual allegations in this case are background to the legal issue of whether the 
State alleged a crime. Even assuming all the alleged facts, which Mr. Hughes does not 
concede, Mr. Hughes contends that the information failed to allege a felony violation of 
the law. 
1 
return and collect the deer with the help his son. (See R., p.1 ) However, on his 
to his truck, he purportedly saw a Fish and Game officer, who was 
investigating a report of poaching. (R., pp.17 4, 184-85.) As a result, Mr. Hughes 
allegedly did not return for the deer. ( See R., p.17 4.) The officer subsequently found 
and took possession of the deer. (R., pp.185-86.) Based on his measurements of the 
animal's antlers, the officer classified it as a "trophy" animal. (R., p.186.) As a result of 
this incident, the State filed four charges against Mr. Hughes: I - Felony Wasteful 
Destruction of Wildlife, II - Felony Unlawful Possession of Wildlife, Ill - Misdemeanor 
Taking an Animal Without a Game Tag, and IV - Misdemeanor Trespass. (R., pp.42-
44.) 
Mr. Hughes subsequently moved to dismiss or reform the information as to 
Counts I and 11, contending that they failed to sufficiently allege violations of the law, and 
thus, failed to confer jurisdiction. (R., pp.71-72.) Specifically, Mr. Hughes argued 
that the relevant statutes generally make it a felony to take animals with a value in 
excess of one thousand dollars and that, generally, mule deer even trophy mule deer 
- only have a reimbursable value of four hundred dollars and, thus, the taking of a mule 
deer is generally not a felony. (R., pp.69-72.) While he recognized there could be an 
enhanced valuation for certain game animals, including mule deer, Mr. Hughes argued 
that Counts I and II did not allege sufficient facts to justify using that enhanced valuation 
because there was no evidence that he had taken the deer "as part of a flagrant 
violation." (R., pp.69-72.) Therefore, he contended that an information simply alleging 
that he had taken a trophy deer was insufficient to allege a felony based on the plain 
2 
language of the statutes, as well as the legislative intent behind the enhanced valuation 
provisions. (R., pp.69-72.) 
The State disagreed with Mr. Hughes' contention that it failed to allege a felony, 
although it did concede that the statute required it to show that the animal was a trophy 
animal and was taken "as part of a flagrant violation." (R., pp.126-27.) It argued that it 
could charge Mr. Hughes for taking an animal valued at over one thousand dollars (a 
felony) because a trophy mule deer could potentially be valued at two thousand dollars 
if it was taken as part of a flagrant violation under the relevant statute. ( See 
R., pp.127-28.) The State argued that the flagrant violation was demonstrated by the 
fact that Mr. Hughes had potentially committed a felony when he took the deer. (See 
R., pp.127-28.) The reason that Mr. Hughes' action was potentially a felony was based 
on the fact that the deer could potentially be valued at two thousand dollars. ( See 
R., pp.127-28.) Therefore, the State argued it was justified in using the enhanced 
valuation of the mule deer because that might make the crime a felony, which in turn, 
would allow the State to use the enhanced valuation of the deer. (See R., pp.127-28.) 
As such, it argued that it had alleged sufficient facts to support Counts I and II by 
alleging the deer was a trophy animal. (See R., pp.125-28.) 
The district court agreed with Mr. Hughes, determining that the plain language of 
the relevant statutes allowed for an increase in the reimbursable value of the animal in 
the following situation: 
[l]f two conditions are met. First, a defendant must plead guilty to or be 
convicted of a flagrant violation as described in I.C. § 36-1402(e). In 
addition, the big game animal must be a trophy big game animal as 
defined in I.C. § 36-202(h) .... [T]he fact that a big game animal qualifies 
as a trophy pursuant to Idaho code, without more, is not enough to raise 
the damage assessment to $2,000. 
3 
(R., pp.189-90.) The district court concluded that the State's interpretation of the statute 
was circular and "ignores the plain language of I.C. § 36-1404 which requires a finding 
of guilt with respect to a flagrant violation before the reimbursable value of the deer 
rises to $2,000." (R., pp.191-92 (emphasis in original).) Therefore, the district court 
determined that, "Count I and Count 11, as specifically alleged by the State in the 
Information ... , do not constitute felonies as a matter of law." (R., pp.192-93.) As a 
result, it granted Mr. Hughes' motion and dismissed those counts. (R., p.193.) 
The State filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from that decision.2 
(R., pp.198-200.) On appeal, the State contends that the district court's interpretation of 
the plain language of the statute was incorrect, and thus, its decision to dismiss Counts 
I and II should be reversed. (App., Br., p.7.) Specifically, it contends that the allegation 
that the mule deer could be valued at two thousand dollars was sufficient to allege the 
necessary flagrant violation to allow the felony charges to proceed. (App. Br., pp.4-7.) 
Mr. Hughes contends that the district court properly dismissed Counts I and II. 
He asserts that the State's proposed in interpretation of the statutes continues to be 
hopelessly circular and, as such, fails to give effect to the plain language of the statute. 
2 Mr. Hughes previously filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction since the appellate rules did not allow for an appeal from an order dismissing 
some, but not all, charges in an Information. (See Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed 
May 5, 2014; Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed May 5, 2014.) The 
State responded, claiming it did have the right to appeal and seeking an order 
prohibiting Mr. Hughes from filing a Respondent's Brief. (Objection to Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion to Deem Case Submitted, filed May 6, 2014.) Mr. Hughes responded to the 
State's motion, and reiterated his underlying claim. (Response to State's Objection to 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Deem Case Submitted, filed May 8, 2014.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court, being fully advised, denied Mr. Hughes' motion to dismiss the appeal, 
as well as the State's motion to deem the case submitted, without explanation. (Order 
Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed June 4, 2014.) 
4 
Therefore, he requests that this Court affirm the district court's order dismissing Counts 
II. Alternatively, he requests that this Court dismiss the State's appeal for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
5 
ISSUE 
framed on appeal as follows: 
Did the district court err by interpreting the applicable fish and game 
statutes to require that the defendant actually be convicted of the crime 
before the state could charge a felony? 
(App. Br., p.2.) 
The State's articulation of the issues is argumentative, such that it misconstrues the 
district court's decision in this case, and is also unduly narrow. Therefore, Mr. Hughes 
would rephrase the issues in this way: 
1. Did the district court properly dismiss Counts I and II of the Information? 
2. Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Properly Dismissed Counts I And II Of The Information 
A. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
Assuming this Court has jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal and evaluate 
the language of the statues at issue (see Part 11, infra), the interpretation of statutes is a 
question of law which is reviewed de nova. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866 (2011 ). 
When considering the interpretation of a statute, the Courts begin with the plain 
meaning of the statute, and in so doing, "effect must be given to all the words of the 
statute, if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 897 (2011 ). If statute is 
unambiguous, the courts are to give effect to the unambiguous language, regardless of 
the perceived propriety of their results. Id. at 896 ("[W]e have never revised or voided 
an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce 
absurd results when construed as written, and we do not have the authority to do so."). 
If, however, the statute is ambiguous, and the ambiguity "exists as to the elements of or 
potential sanctions for a crime, this Court will strictly construe the statute in favor of the 
defendant." State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274 (2004); see also State v. Trusda/1, 155 
Idaho 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[l]f a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity 
applies and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused.") Finally, if the Court 
must resort to statutory interpretation, "it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent, 
and give effect to that intent." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). 
7 
The State's Interpretation Of The Relevant Statutes Does Not Give Effect To The 
Plain Language Of The Statutes; The Statutes Unambiguously Do Not Allow The 
Increased Valuation Of The Animal Unless The State Can Prove That The 
Defendant Took The Animal As Part Of A Flagrant Violation 
In this case, the district court appropriately determined that Counts I and II failed 
to allege crimes, and so, properly dismissed those two charges. (R., p.189.) The State, 
however, contends on appeal that, because a trophy deer could have a value of two 
thousand dollars, the allegations to that effect were sufficient to save Counts I and II. 
(App. Br., pp.4-5.) However, a closer examination of the statutes reveals that to be 
untrue. 
In this the State alleged a felony violation because it alleged the mule deer 
had a reimbursable value of more than one thousand dollars pursuant to I.C. § 36-
1401 (c)(3).3 (R., pp.43-44.) Generally, mule deer only have a reimbursable value of 
four hundred dollars. I.C. § 36-1404(a)(3) (general valuation section).4 Thus, as 
3 I.C. § 36-1401 (c)(3) reads, in its entirety: 
Any person who pleads guilty to, is found guilty of or is convicted of a 
violation of the following offenses shall be guilty of a felony: 
3. Unlawfully killing, possessing or wasting of any combination of 
numbers of species of wildlife within a twelve (12) month period 
which has a single or combined reimbursable damage assessment 
of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), as provided in section 
36-1404, Idaho Code. 
4 Although not separately numbered, I.C. § 36-1404(a) effectively has two sections, 
(hereinafter, general valuation section and enhanced valuation section). The general 
valuation section provides, in relevant part: 
In addition to the penalties provided for violating any of the provisions of 
title 36, Idaho Code, any person who pleads guilty, is found guilty of or is 
convicted of the illegal killing or the illegal possession or illegal waste of 
game animals or birds or fish shall reimburse the state for each animal so 
killed or possessed or wasted as follows: 
3. Any other species of big game, four hundred dollars ($400) per 
animal killed, possessed or wasted. 
8 
the district court properly pointed out, absent further information, Mr. Hughes' taking of 
the mule deer in this case was not a felony. 5 (R., p.189.) 
As the district court also properly recognized, the conclusion regarding the deer's 
reimbursable value would change if the State were able to access the enhanced 
valuation section of the statute, where a trophy mule deer would be valued at two 
thousand dollars. See I.C. § 36-1404(a)(1) (enhanced valuation section).6 As even the 
State conceded below, to access the enhanced valuation section, and thus elevate the 
taking of a mule deer to a felony, the State is required to prove two things: 1) that the 
animal that was taken qualified as a trophy animal; and 2) that the animal was taken "as 
part of a flagrant violation." ( See R., pp.126-27 (State's brief below conceding this 
point); R., p.189 (district court determining that the plain language of the statute makes 
this requirement).) There are several ways in which a person could commit a flagrant 
violation, but the State only charged one in this case. As such, in this case, the State 
was required to prove that Mr. Hughes "enter[ed] a plea of guilty, [was] found guilty, or 
5 The taking of the deer reflects the alleged possession of the deer in Count II. 
However, all this analysis is equally applicable to the alleged wasting of the deer in 
Count I, since the increase to a felony for wasting a mule deer hinges on the same 
valuation considerations. See I.C. § 36-1401 (c)(3). 
6 The enhanced valuation section provides: 
Provided further, that any person who pleads guilty, is found guilty of, or is 
convicted of a flagrant violation, in accordance with section 36-1402(e), 
Idaho Code, involving the illegal killing, illegal possession or illegal waste 
of a trophy big game animal as defined in section 36-202(h), Idaho Code, 
shall reimburse the state for each animal so killed, possessed or wasted, 
as follows: 
1. Trophy mule deer: two thousand dollars ($2,000) per animal 
killed, possessed or wasted. 
9 
[was] convicted of ... Any felony violation provided in section 36-1401, Idaho 
§ 36-1402(e)(6).7 
The State asserts on appeal that: because a trophy mule deer could be valued 
at two thousand dollars, illegally taking it would be a felony; because that taking would 
be a felony, the taking of that trophy-class animal would constitute a flagrant violation; 
because it would be a flagrant violation, the deer would have a reimbursable value of 
two thousand dollars. (App. Br., p.6.) This reasoning, however, constitutes a petitio 
principii fallacy, 8 since the State assumes the truth of the conclusion - that the deer is 
properly valued at two thousand dollars - and uses that conclusion as the starting place 
for analysis. 
7 Idaho Code§ 36-1402(e) provides, in its entirety: 
Flagrant violations. In addition to any other penalties assessed by the 
court, the magistrate hearing the case shall forthwith revoke the hunting, 
fishing or trapping privileges, for a period of not less than one (1) year and 
may revoke the privileges for a period up to and including the person's 
lifetime, for any person who enters a plea of guilty, who is found guilty, or 
who is convicted of any of the following flagrant violations: 
1. Taking a big game animal after sunset by spotlighting, with use 
of artificial light, or with a night vision enhancement device. 
2. Unlawfully taking two (2) or more big game animals within a 
twelve (12) month period. 
3. Taking a big game animal with a rimfire or centerfire cartridge 
firearm during an archery or muzzleloader only hunt. 
4. Hunting, fishing, trapping or purchasing a license when license 
privileges have been revoked pursuant to this section or section 
36-1501, Idaho Code. 
5. Taking any big game animal during a closed season. 
6. Any felony violation provided in section 36-1401, Idaho Code. 
8 Petitio principia, or postulation of the beginning, is a logical fallacy in which the 
premise to be proved is implicitly taken for granted. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary and 
Thesaurus Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/petitio%20principii (last 
visited June 25, 2014). 
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The interpretation of the relevant statutes also ignores plain language 
of statutes, as it fails to account for the second requirement for gaining access to 
the enhanced valuation section: the enhanced valuation is only applicable where the 
State can show that the animal was taken during the commission of a felony under 
I.C. § 36-1401(c). See I.C. § 36-1404(a). It is important to remember that these 
enhanced valuations are, by the statutory language, meant to function as an additional 
punishment. Id. ("In addition to the penalties provided for violating any of the provisions 
of title 36, Idaho Code, any person who pleads guilty, is found guilty of or is convicted of 
the illegal killing or the illegal possession or illegal waste of game animals or birds or 
fish shall reimburse the state for each animal so killed or possessed or wasted .... ") 
(emphasis added). Thus, the enhanced valuation section is, by its very nature, an 
enhancement to the punishment, which is based on the proof of some additional fact 
that the general valuation section does not require. See I.C. § 36-1404(a). 
The plain language of the statutes demonstrates that, in cases such as this, 
where the State is alleging a felony based on the reimbursable value of the animal(s) 
killed, 9 the additional fact the State must prove is that the illegal taking already 
constituted a felony violation on its own (i.e., that it constitutes a felony without resorting 
to the enhanced valuation section). Essentially, if the general valuation of the animal(s) 
9 A person could also commit a felony under I.C. § 36-1401 by selling parts of an animal 
he knows to have been illegally taken, releasing certain types of creatures into the wild, 
or being a persistent violator of this statute. I.C. § 36-1401 (c)(1 ), (2), (4). Thus, he 
might commit a felony violation while shooting a mule deer if he qualifies as a persistent 
violator under I.C. § 36-1401 (c)(4 ). This would be the situation most analogous to the 
district court's reasoning - that the State has to prove that the defendant pied guilty to a 
felony violation before the value increases. (See R., pp.191-92.) That is, therefore, a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute in that regard, and it, unlike the State's 
interpretation, gives effect to the enhancement ideals of the statute, applying it only to 
particularly egregious violations of these laws. 
11 
taken one thousand dollars, then the person is subject to 
penalties, provided the animal(s) is/are trophy-class, since that 
enhanced 
would have 
taken the animal(s) while committing a "felony violation provided in" the statute. See 
LC. 36-1401. However, if the general valuation of the animal(s) taken does not exceed 
one thousand dollars, the person is not subject to the enhanced penalties, regardless of 
whether the animal(s) is/are trophy-class, since that person would not have taken the 
animal(s) while committing a "felony violation provided in" the statute. id. 
Thus, any person who takes a single caribou, for example, would commit a 
felony simply by taking that animal, since it has a general reimbursable value of 
"1,500. 10 I.C. § 36-1404(a)(2). Similarly, a person who takes an and two bull 
trout would commit a felony simply by taking those animals, since they have a combined 
general reimbursable value of $1,200. 11 See I.C. § 36-1404(a)(1 ), (3). On the other 
hand, a person who takes a mule deer and a chinook salmon would not commit a felony 
by taking those animals, since they have a combined general reimbursable value of 
$650. See I.C. § 36-1404(a)(3)-(4 ). 
Therefore, simply taking a single mule deer, as the State has alleged in this case, 
does not constitute a felony violation of I.C. § 36-1401, since that mule deer only has a 
general reimbursable value of four hundred dollars. See I.C. § 36-1404(a). Since the 
taking of a mule deer does not otherwise constitute a "felony violation provided in 
10 As a result of the fact that taking a single caribou is automatically a felony, a person 
who illegally takes a single trophy caribou would commit a "flagrant violation," and 
would, therefore, be subject to the enhanced penalties. However, that is not the case 
where the taking of a single animal is not automatically a felony, as is the case with 
mule deer. 
11 The value of the second bull trout would be double the listed value, since it is an 
additional animal of the same category, as set forth in another unnumbered section 
following the enhanced valuation section. See I.C. § 36-1404(a). 
12 
provided in section 36-140·1, Idaho Code," the act of taking of a single mule deer, 
trophy-class or not, does not constitute a flagrant violation under I.C. § 404(a). 
Since the taking does not constitute a flagrant violation, the State cannot access the 
enhanced valuation section, and so, cannot allege the crime as a felony. 
The State's interpretation of the statute fails to give effect to the requirement that 
it show a felony violation of section 36-1401 before the value of the animal is enhanced. 
The district court, on the other hand, appears to have appreciated this distinction in the 
statutes, as it ruled that the flagrant violation had to be established "before the 
reimbursable value rises to $2,000."12 (R., pp.191-92 (emphasis in original).) And even 
if this Court concludes that the district court's interpretation of the statute is inadequate 
or inaccurate, this Court should still affirm its order under the plain language of the 
statute. See, e.g., Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 
Idaho 573, 580 (1993) (holding that, where the order of the district court is correct, but 
based upon an erroneous theory, the appellate courts will affirm the district court's order 
on the correct theory). As such, this Court should affirm the order dismissing Counts I 
and II for failing to allege felony violations of the law under the plain and unambiguous 
language of the statute. 
12 The district court did not hold that the State has to prove that the defendant 
committed this crime before it can charge this crime as a felony. (See App. Br., p.2 
(State's issue statement misstating the district court's holding to this effect).) Rather, it 
required the State has to prove a flagrant violation independent of the enhanced value 
of the animal. (See R., pp.191-92.) Thus, the State's mistaken issue statement 
demonstrates not only the State's circular interpretation of the statutes, but its 
fundamental misunderstanding of the plain language of the statutes as well. 
13 
If This Court Determines That The Statute Is Ambiguous, It Should Apply The 
Rule Of Lenity Because Any Ambiguity Would Go To The Elements Of, Or 
Potential Sanctions For, A Crime 
In event that this Court determines the interpretation of the applicable 
statutes is also a reasonable one, then the statute would be ambiguous. See, e.g., 
Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881 (2008). If the statute is ambiguous, this Court 
should apply the rule of lenity and interpret the statute in Mr. Hughes' favor, since an 
ambiguity would exist as to the elements the State has to show in order to prove a 
felony violation. Doe, 140 Idaho at 274; Trusda/1, 155 Idaho at 969. As discussed in 
subsection B, supra, the enhanced valuation section adds elements that the State must 
prove. As a result, this Court should apply 
district court's order dismissing Counts I and II. 
rule of lenity and, therefore, affirm the 
D. If This Court Decides To Engage In Statutory Interpretation In This Matter, 
Mr. Hughes' Interpretation Of The Statute Is Consistent With The Legislative 
Intent Of The Statutes 
Should this Court decide that the rule of lenity does not apply in this case, and 
so, decide to engage in statutory interpretation in regard to these statutes, its goal 
should be to give effect to the legislative intent of the statutes. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 
642. The evidence in the record demonstrates that the Legislature, in enacting these 
statutes, intended that cases not constitute felony violations of the law simply because 
the animal killed was a trophy animal. For example, in the 1998 legislative session, the 
Legislature discussed a bill that was designed to increase the fines of people who had 
taken big game animals. (See R., p.98.) The minutes indicate that the increased fines 
would only apply if the person was "a 'flagrant violator' as defined by the Legislature [in 
1997]." (R., p.98.) In those discussions, the Legislature referenced a handout that had 
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been provided to the Legislature in both 1997 and 1998, which revealed how the 
Legislature had defined the term in 1997. 13 (See , pp.98, 153.) 
That handout takes the form of a questionnaire and asks questions related to the 
first five flagrant violations identified in I.C. § 36-1402(e). 14 (R., p.100.) Specifically, it 
states: "If you answered no to all of the above questions, you are not a flagrant violator. 
You would not be subject to these penalties, even if you illegally took a trophy big game 
animal." (R., p.100 (emphasis in italics added, emphasis underlined from original).) 
Thus, the evidence in the legislative record demonstrates that the Legislature did not 
intend the simple fact that the hunter took a trophy animal to trigger the enhancement, 
as the State contends in this case. (Compare App. Br., pp.4-7.) Therefore, the State's 
argument - that it can use the enhanced valuation section just because the animal is 
trophy-class - does not comport with the legislative intent of the enhanced valuation 
section, and so, should be rejected. 
Therefore, if this Court determines the statutes are ambiguous, and that the rule 
of lenity does not apply, Mr. Hughes' interpretation of the statutes gives effect to the 
legislative intent and the State's interpretation is directly contradictory to the 
Legislature's intent. As such, this Court should adopt Mr. Hughes' interpretation of the 
statutes at issue in this case and affirm the district court's order dismissing Counts I 
and II. 
13 The fact that the 1998 minutes rely on the handout as reflective of the legislative 
intent behind the 1997 bill which established the enhanced valuation section 
demonstrates that the handout is an accurate representation of the Legislature's intent 
when it established the enhanced valuation section of I.C. § 36-1404(a), particularly 
since that handout was used during the discussion of the 1997 bill (see, e.g., R., p.153). 
14 The questionnaire does not address I.C. § 36-1402(e)(6), "Any felony violations .... " 
(See R., p.100.) 
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11. 
This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Consider The State's Appeal 
A. Applicable Law 
The question of "[w]hether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may 
be raised at any time."15 State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004 ). The notice of 
appeal serves to perfect the appeal and confer jurisdiction over the claims on the 
appellate courts. See Floyd v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 
723 (2002) (holding that an untimely notice of appeal was "inadequate to confer 
jurisdiction" upon the appellate court). One prerequisite to jurisdiction is a right to 
appeal, based on the grounds identified in I.A.R. 11 (c). See v. Young, 1 Idaho 
·177, 178 Cl 999) (noting that the right to appeal was traditionally articulated in 
up until the Idaho Appellate Rules were adopted). When the challenged order does not 
fall within the grounds identified in I.AR. 11(c), "the notice of appeal ... confers no 
appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed." State v. Rollins, 103 Idaho 
48, 49-50 (Ct. App. 1982). 
While the appellant's claim must usually fall under one of the enumerated rights 
to appeal in I.AR. 11(c), see Young, 133 Idaho at 178, there is another mechanism by 
which the State might pursue its appeal: through an exercise of this Court's plenary 
power to review decisions by the district court. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to exercise its plenary authority so as to allow the State to appeal 
15 Mr. Hughes acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court denied his motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but notes that it did so without explanation. As such, he 
maintains that the appellate rules do not afford the State the right to appeal the district 
court's order in this case, and therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. 
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when I.A.R. 11 (c) does not afford the State the right to appeal. See, e.g., 
State v. Molinelli, 105 Idaho 833, 835 (1983); State v. Dennard, 102 Idaho 824, 
(1982); State v. Zarate, 98 Idaho 342, 344 (1977); State v. Daugherty, 98 Idaho 716, 
716-17 (1977); State v. Maddock, 97 Idaho 610, 611 (1976); State v. Berlin, 95 Idaho 
B. 
227 (1973), superseded by rule as stated in Young, 133 Idaho at 178-79. 
The Idaho Appellate Rules Do Not Provide The State A Right To Appeal The 
Dismissal Of Two Counts Of A Multi-Count Information 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the "literal language" of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules govern whether I.AR. 11 (c) confers the right to appeal. See, 
Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835; Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825. Specifically, in Molinelli, 
the was claiming that, pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(3), it could appeal an order 
reducing the charge from delivery of a controlled substance to possession of a 
controlled substance. Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835. However, at that time, I.AR. 11 (c)(3) 
only afforded the right to appeal "'[a]n order granting a motion to dismiss an information 
or complaint."'16 Id. (quoting I.A.R. 11 (c)(3)). As such, the Idaho Supreme Court 
concluded that "[t]he district court's order clearly does not fall within the literal language 
of the Rule, and applying the reasoning set forth in Dennard, supra, we decline to so 
construe the Rule simply to give the State a right of appeal under these circumstances." 
Id. In Dennard, the Idaho Supreme Court had refused to "stretch the language of [the 
Rule] beyond its plain meaning," particularly when an alternative mechanism (the 
16 The Idaho Appellate Rules have since been amended to allow an appeal from "[a]ny 
order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct over the objection 
of the prosecutor." I.A.R. 11 (c)(5). 
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Court's power) to appeal existed. 17 Dennard, 102 Idaho Since reducing 
a charge not dismiss the Information, the Supreme Court dismissed the State's 
appeal. See Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835. 
In this case, the literal language of the rule invoked by the State (I.AR. 11 (c)(5)) 
only allows appeals of "[a]ny order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal 
conduct over the prosecutor's objection." I.AR. 11 (c)(5) (emphasis added). In this 
case, the charges in Counts I and II were not reduced. Rather, Counts I and II were 
dismissed. ( See R., p.197.) The critical difference is evident when this case is 
compared with Molinelli. In Molinelli, the defendant still faced punishment under the 
charges following the district court's order, whereas Mr. Hughes does not. In fact, the 
prosecutor expressly stated to the district court that Mr. Hughes will not reduced 
charges in this regard. (Tr., p.11, Ls.13-15 ("I don't intend to try this as a misdemeanor, 
but I do intend to appeal this if it has some legs.").) Since the challenged order did not 
"reduce the charge," this appeal does not fall under the literal language of I.AR. 
11 (c)(5). As such, I.AR. 11 (c)(5) does not give the State the right to appeal this case. 
None of the other grounds to appeal identified in I.AR. 11 (c) allow the State's 
appeal either. For example, I.A.R. 11 (c)(3) only allows appeals from "[a]n order 
granting a motion to dismiss an information or complaint." I.A.R. 11 (c)(3) (emphasis 
added); see Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835. In this case, the information survived the 
challenged order. (See generally R.) The continued viability of Counts Ill and IV do not 
hinge on this Court's resolution of the State's challenges on appeal. They are separate 
17 However, as will be discussed in depth infra, the Dennard Court subsequently 
determined that an exercise of the Court's plenary power was not appropriate to allow 
such an appeal. See Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825-26. 
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charges, born different, but related, of facts than Counts I and IL (See 
, pp.42-44.) Therefore, the information survived the dismissing Counts I and 11, 
and thus, the district court did not "dismiss an information," as contemplated by 
I.AR. 11 (c)(3). 
Nor is this appeal proper under I.A.R. 11 (c)(4 ). That subsection allows for 
appeals from "[a]ny order or judgment, whenever entered and however denominated, 
terminating a criminal action, provided that this provision shall not authorize a new trial 
in any case where the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy would otherwise 
prevent a second trial." I.AR. 11(c)(4) (emphasis added). The Legislature has defined 
the term "criminal action": "The proceedings by which a party charged with a public 
offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment is known as a criminal action." 
I.C. § 19-103. Since the proceedings, which are currently suspended, will continue in 
regard to Counts Ill and IV, regardless of the outcome of this appeal, the criminal action 
has not been terminated. Compare State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 584 (Ct. App. 
2008) (noting that a criminal action is terminated when a defendant is no longer facing 
charges, and is thus, no longer in "jeopardy," and so, must be freed from incarceration). 
In this case, Mr. Hughes is still facing at least two charges from the original information. 
Therefore, the criminal action was not terminated by the order dismissing Counts I 
and II. 
None of the other provisions in I.A.R. 11 (c) are applicable either. The State is 
not appealing a final judgment of conviction or an order granting or denying a withheld 
judgment or a plea of guilty. I.A.R. 11 (c)(1 )-(2). Nor is it challenging a judgment 
imposing sentence. I.A.R. 11 (c)(6). It is not challenging an order granting a motion to 
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suppress evidence. I.AR. 11 (c)(?). It is also not challenging an order granting or 
denying a new trial or a decision by the district court sitting in its appellate capacity. 
I.AR. 11 (c)(8), (10). Finally, it is not challenging an "order made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or state," since no judgment has been 
entered in this case. I.AR. 11 (c)(9). Therefore, I.AR. 11 (c) does not afford the State 
the right to appeal the order dismissing Counts I and 11. 
C. According To Idaho Supreme Court Precedent, This Is Not The Type Of Case 
Where This Court Should Exercise Its Plenary Authority 
While the Idaho Appellate Rules do not permit the State's appeal, the Idaho 
Constitution affords plenary authority to the Idaho Supreme Court to review any district 
court ruling: "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any 
decision of the district courts .... The Supreme Court shall also have original 
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and 
all writs necessary or proper to complete the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction." 
IDAH0 CONST., art. V § 9. The Supreme Court's interpretation of that authority provides 
that the exercise of its plenary authority is appropriate when there are: 
important questions concerning the construction of Idaho's Constitution 
and its criminal rules and statutes[,] questions which we note are of a 
recurring nature and the resolution of which will be of practical importance 
in the administration of the criminal justice system which must be resolved 
to prevent future criminal proceedings from being improperly dismissed or 
reduced by erroneous rulings of the magistrate or district judge. 
Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 802 (1977). However, exercise of that power is not 
warranted in this case. For example, the State may be able to appeal after the two 
remaining counts are resolved pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(4) (order terminating a criminal 
action). Alternatively, it could have sought a permissive appeal within fourteen days of 
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the order in question. I.A.R. 12. As a result, deciding the present appeal would not be 
to ensure proceedings are improperly dismissed by erroneous rulings, and 
so, the exercise of plenary authority is not warranted in this case. See Stockwell, 98 
Idaho at 802. 
Additionally, exercise of this Court's plenary authority would not allow the Court 
to correct an identified error in this particular case. Rather, it would allow the Court to 
issue an advisory opinion to influence future cases, since the purpose of the plenary 
authority is to address an issue to "prevent future criminal proceedings from being 
improperly dismissed .... " Id. When the Court has exercised its plenary authority in 
the past, its opinions have done exactly that, providing instruction as to the important 
issues brought to its attention, but not affording the remedy requested in the actual 
pending appeal. See, e.g., State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888-89 (1985) (Donaldson, 
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and specially concurring)18; State v. Lewis, 96 
Idaho 743 (1975)19; State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759 (1972),20 superseded by rule as stated 
18 In Alanis, Chief Justice Donaldson was a swing vote in the split opinion. As a result, 
that opinion holds that an erroneous application of I.C.R. 12(b) was an important issue 
on which the Supreme Court needed to give guidance under the plenary rule, but that 
double jeopardy prevented retrial of the defendant. See generally Alanis, 109 Idaho 
884. The result is that the plurality's discussion of I.C.R. 12(b), in which the Chief 
Justice joined, functions as an advisory opinion. See id. 
19 In Lewis, the Idaho Supreme Court decided to exercise its plenary authority so as to 
clarify the construction of the criminal statute under which the defendant was 
prosecuted. Id. at 747. In particular, the Supreme Court considered whether the district 
court properly granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, finding that it 
had erroneously weighed the evidence based on its improper understanding of the 
statutes at issue. Id. at 747-50. However, that opinion constituted an advisory opinion 
since the constitutional protection against double jeopardy prevented retrying the 
defendant under the proper understanding of the statute. Id. at 750-51. 
20 In Tinno, the parties raised "several important issues relating to the effect of the Fort 
Bridger Treaty on Indian fishing right claims." Tinno, 94 Idaho at 761-62. However, the 
State did not have a right to appeal on the facts presented. Tinno, 94 Idaho at 
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in Young, 133 Idaho at 178-79. The Idaho Supreme Court has already decided that 
such as the one presented in this case are not the sort of situation requiring 
the Court's guidance, as it has already refused to exercise its plenary authority on this 
very question - whether an appeal is properly brought under I.AR. 11 (c). See, e.g., 
Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835-36; Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825-26. The Idaho Supreme 
Court explained its rationale in the Dennard opinion: 
We do not believe article V, s 9 was intended by the Framers of our 
Constitution to be lightly invoked; there must be some dismissals which 
this Court, in the interests of judicial economy, will not hear on appeal. 
We believe benefit to judicial administration results when trial judges know 
that this Court will not entertain an unappealable order simply because an 
appeal is attempted. This instant case falls way short of reaching the 
importance of Tinno and Lewis. 
Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825-26 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court 
concluded that a decision on the merits of this sort of argument on appeal would 
"have little effect on the administration of justice in this state." Id. at 826. As such, it 
dismissed the State's appeal rather than exercise the plenary authority. Id. 
The same conclusion, which has been reached in numerous cases, is merited in 
this case. See Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835-36 (citing Zarate, 98 Idaho at 344; 
Daugherty, 98 Idaho at 716-17; Maddock, 97 Idaho at 611; Berlin, 95 Idaho at 227). 
This is one of those dismissals which, in the interests of judicial economy (particularly 
given the prosecutor's statements about the future of these charges (Tr., p.11, 
Ls.13-14)), should not be heard on appeal. See Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825-26. 
761. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, but issued an advisory opinion under 
its plenary authority to resolve those important issues briefed by the parties. See Lewis, 
96 Idaho at 746 (explaining the Tinno opinion). 
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Therefore, this Court should dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the 
order dismissing Counts I and II. 
CONCLUSION 
appeal from the 
Mr. Hughes respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
dismissing Counts I and II. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court dismiss the 
State's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 2014. 
AN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of June, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
JEFFREY J HUGHES 
60 JUGHANDLE DRIVE 
MCCALL ID 83638 
THOMAS F NEVILLE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
MICHAEL G. PIERCE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
BRD/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
24 

